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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab

AUTO LEASE COMPANY, a partnership,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

No.

vs.

8746

CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,
a corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Defendant and Respondent

NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant-respondent issued a policy of insurance to
the plaintiff-appellant and the Bearings Service & Supply Company, which is not a party to this action, insuring five automobiles which were leased to the Bearings Service & Supply
Company by the plaintiff-appellant. The policy covered, among
other things, damage incurred by reason of upset or collision.
The automobile described in the complaint of plaintiff-appellant

3
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was an automobile which was being procured to replace one
of the five leased by plaintiff-appellant to Bearings Service &
Supply Company. The particular automobile was involved in
a collision and damaged while it was enroute from Michigan
to Salt Lake City, Utah.
On a Motion For Summary Judgment the District Court
decided that the damage to the automobile was not covered

by the insurance policy of the defendant-respondent, and this
appeal is taken from the court's ruling.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Motion For Summary Judgment was based on the
pleadings in the file, the deposition of C. R. Jacobs and the
exhibits introduced at the hearing on the Motion. These documents go to make up the record on appeal. The pleadings will
be referred to by "R. -", the deposition by t(Dep. -'' and the
exhibits by their number.

C. R. Jacobs testified in his deposition that at the time
of the accident referred to in plaintiff's complaint, February 2,

1956, (R. 2) he was a partner with A. Palmer Holt in the
plaintiff firm, Auto Lease Company (Dep. 2). The Auto Lease
Company O\Vned between fifteen and twenty vehicles, all of
\vhich \vere leased out to other persons or firms (Dep.
They had a lease (Exhibit

3).

2) under the terms of which they

were to supply Bearings Service & Supply Company with the
vehicles which Bearings Service & Supply used in i~s business
(l)ep.

4).

PlaintiiT started furnishing Bearings Service & Supply
4
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Cmnpany with automobiles about eighteen months before this
accident occurred. In the beginning they furnished them with
two automobiles, which were increased from time to time until
at the time of this accident the plaintiff was furnishing Bearings
Service & Supply Company with five automobiles ( Dep. 4).
The automobiles were furnished on a yearly basis and were
to be replaced with new automobiles at the end of twelve
months' use (Dep. 4). The lease provided that the Bearings
Service & Supply Company was to furnish insurance to cover
the vehicles which were leased to them and had procured a
policy from the defendant company. The plaintiff-appellant
and the Bearings Service & Supply Company were shown as
insured on the policy (Exhibit 1). The policy contained a fleet
schedule describing five vehicles. Two of the vehicles originally
insured had apparently been disposed of prior to the accident
and two others inserted in their place. The important thing
is that the five vehicles insured were described in the policy
and the policy was issued in the name of Bearings Service &
Supply Company and Auto Lease Company. The other vehicles
owned by the plaintiff and presumably leased to other firms or
persons were admittedly not covered by this poli~y (Dep. 5).
The policy further provided, according to the con1plaint,
which is admitted for the purpose of the Motion:
"if the insured * * * acquires ownership of another automobile and so notifies the company within
thirty days following the date of its delivery, such
insurance as is afforded by this policy applies also to
such other autotnobile as of the date of such acquisition;
(a) if it replaces an auto1nobile described in this
policy, or (b) if it is an additional autornobile and
if the company insures all automobiles owned by the
insured * * * ."
5
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At the request of Bearings Service & Supply Company the
plaintiff-appellant had decided to replace one of the automobiles being used by Bearings Service & Supply Company in
accordance \vith the terms of its lease (Dep. 6). As alleged in
paragraph 4 of the complaint, a 1956 Chevrolet V-8 210 4
door station wagon, Motor number 0011887, Serial Number
VB 565004649, was being secured and was to replace a station
wagon Serial number VB 55}003559, listed as item number 4
on the fleet schedule of the defendant's policy (R. 2). The
plaintiff-appellant secured the new automobile through a dealer,
Wilson's Drive-away, in Chicago, Illinois. It arranged with
the dealer to have one of his men drive the car to Salt Lake
City but apparently delivery to the appellant was to take place
in Chicago (Dep. 7-8). Title to the vehicle was sent to the
plaintiff through the mail on the morning of the accident
described in plaintiff's complaint and the car was billed to
the plaintiff-appellant on open account.
At the time of the accident the Bearings Service & Supply
Cotnpany \Yas still using the vehicle which was to be replaced
by the vehicle secured through the dealer in Chicago. The
following appears on page 10 of the deposition:
In other words, was this automobile which this
new automobile was being acquired to replacedid your agreement contemplate that the old
automobile v.rould stay with them until you supplied them with a new vehicle?

ttA. Yes, that is right.
ttQ. So at the ti1ne of this automobile accident Bear~ng
Service & Supply still had within their possesston
five auton1obiles ?''
ttA. Right."
6
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According to the plaintiff's Complaint ( R. 1-2) , the vehicle
being secured from the dealer in Chicago was wrecked in an
automobile accident which occurred on U. S. Highway 30
sixteen miles west of Cheyenne, Wyoming on February 2,
1956, which was two days after it had been acquired on January
31, 1956. Thereafter the plaintiff-appellant apparently sold
the vehicle for salvage and received $389.51, which sum was
paid to the plaintiff, Auto Lease Company, and the Auto
Lease Company paid for the car, sustaining an alleged damage
of $1,946.74. It also thereafter made demand upon the insurance carrier under the aforementioned insurance policy, claiming that the vehicle was covered under the provisions of the
insurance policy for automatic coverage set out in plaintiff's
Complaint and previously set out herein.
The District Court held that the damaged vehicle did not
replace an automobile described in the policy nor was it an
additional automobile as that term is defined by said insurance
policy, and entered judgment for the defendant-respondent.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The damaged vehicle did not replace an automobile
described in the policy or was not an additional vehicle as
defined by the policy.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DAMAGED VEHICLE DID NOT REPLACE AN
.-\UT01t10Bil.E DESCRIBED IN Tl-IE POLICY OR \Y/ AS
NOT AN ADDITIONAL VEHICLE AS DEFINED BY THE
POLICY.
7
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The construction and application of the automatic insurance clause or substitution provision of an automobile liability
or indemnity policy_ is discussed in an annotation beginning at
34 A.L.R. 2d 93 7, from which the following quotations are
taken:
((No citation of authority is required to support the
proposition that in the absence of a provision for the
extension of coverage of an automobile liability or
indemnity policy to automobiles other than those described in the policy, or of specific approval of the
change, the insurer does not cover the insured's liability
resulting from the use of such other automobiles.
··This annotation * * * concerns itself essentially
with three types of provisions which have found their
way into automobile liability and indemnity policies
in recent years, and whose common feature is that they
are all intended to provide coverage, under specified
conditions, for vehicles not described in the policy,
without the necessity of first securing the insurer's
approval to the change or addition.
··with some exceptions, the first two of these provisions, the ·replacement' provision and the ·blanket'
or •fleet' provision, are generally found in the same
clause, the so-called ·automatic insurance' clause, under
which coverage is extended automatically to newly
acquired automobiles, the (replacement' provision dealing v;ith automobiles acquired to replace those described in the policy, the (blanket' or (fleet' provision
\Vith those added to the already insured vehicles.

* * * * *
ttln Home lvlut. Ins. Co. v. Rose ( 1945, CA8th
Neb.) 150 F 2d 201, the court stated that the tau~o
rnatic insurance' clause in standard policies was totended to meet the necessity for tnaintaining continuous insurance on cars in the presence of the recognized
8
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custom among insured owners of acquiring other cars
by replacement and new purchases during the life of
their policies.

* * * * *

Ct Another prerequisite to coverage, based on the caption of the (automatic insurance' clause, as well as on
the phrase (acquires ownership of another automobile,'
in the introductory portion, which recurs throughout
the clause in the words (such other automobile,' is that
the insured acquire (ownership' of the automobile
claimed to be covered.

* * * * *

((In view of the express provision of the (automatic
insurance' clause that coverage of the new automobile
commences on the date of its delivery, it is evident that
such delivery is an essential prerequisite to coverage.
((In Dean v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. ( 193 7) 24 Cal
App 2d Supp 762, 68 P2d 1021, the fact that at the
time of the accident the car described in the policy
was still registered in the insured's name, while the
car he was driving was not yet registered, was held not
to preclude coverage of the second car, the court stating
that the word (delivery' in this context had the ordinary
meaning of a handing over of physical possession and
control of the automobile, and that insurance coverage
attached to the replacing automobile as of the date of
such delivery, provided the insured, either prior or
subsequent to delivery, acquired the legal status of
registered owner. It was further held, however, that
if the insured, at the time of the accident, was driving
the car simply to try it out, with a view to its possible
purchase, the insurer could not be liable.

* * * * *

CtOne of the primary requirements of the (replacement' provision is that the new automobile (replaces'
an automobile described in the policy.

* *

* * *

I

9
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((But in Mitcham v. Travelers Indem. Co. (1942, CA
4th NC) 127 F 2d 27, it was held that a car purchased
by the insured was not within the protection of the
policy in view of the fact that the new automobile described in the policy was not traded in for the new
car, but was left v1ith the dealer to be sold, with the
title remaining in the insured. Pointing out that the
insured could at any time have taken the old car from
the custody of the dealer and put it into use, or that
the dealer could have used the car on the insured's
behalf in order to demonstrate it to a customer, and
that in either case it would still have been covered
by the policy, the court stated that these circumstances
distinguished the case from Merchants Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Lambert (1940) 90 NH 507, 11 A 2d 361, 127
ALR 483, supra, where the old car was not in condition
to be driven on the public highway."
Thus, it will be seen that in order for an automobile to
be covered as an additional automobile under the automatic
provision of the policy the automobile must actually be delivered to the insured and he must actually have the right to
and assume custody, possession and control of the automobile.
This is illustrated by two cases:
In Main lnv. Co. of Passaic v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 102 A. (2d) 112 (New Jersey 1953), plaintiff
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine if a certain
automobile was covered under the ttnewly acquired" automobile provision of the policy. The evidence showed that
plaintiff had been negotiating with a third party for the purchase of the automobile. The automobile had been stolen
f rotn the third party and the plaintiff had sent one of its
l'lnployees to bring it back. The tenns of the s~1le had not been
finally agreed to by the plaintiff. On the return trip the
10
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employee was involved in an accident and the car was completely 'vrecked on May 28, 1952. The plaintiff actually agreed
to purchase the car on the 6th day of June, 1952. The court
held that the evidence was insufficient to establish insured's
claim that he was the beneficial owner of the automobile at
the tin1e of the accident, and further held that the plaintiff
had failed to establish that the ('additional automobile'' provision vvould be applicable as it had not shown that the defendant insured all of the automobiles owned by the plaintiff
and that it had not shown that this was a replacement for any
automobile owned by the plaintiff.
The second case is Everly v. Creech, 294 P. (2d) 109
(California 1956). The court decided in favor of the insurer

on the theory that the insured had not given notice as required
under the policy, but in deciding when notice should have been
given the court discussed when the automobile was "acquired."
The evidence showed that Everly acquired possession of such
automobile more than thirty days prior to the accident and
that he was in possession '(with full use of it and exercised
dominion over it at all times" for more than thirty days prior
to the accident. Legal title to the automobile vvas secured three
days prior to the accident. The court held:
"Under the circumstances here appearing, a finding
of full use and the exercise of dominion over this car
is equivalent to a finding of ownership within the
meaning of the policy. \'V e think these findings were
sufficient to support the judgment. The court found
that Everly acquired possession of the Ford prior to
August 25 and that he had possession \vith full use
of it and exercised dominion over it at all tirnes thereafter up to the date of the collision. It was also found
that it \Vas not true that he had purchased and acquired
11
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this car within thirty days of the accident. A clear
intent appears from the findings as a whole to find all
the material facts against the plaintiff, and the findings
are sufficient for that purpose. Johndrow v. Thomas,
31 Cal. 2d 202, 187 P. 2d 681."

The other conclusion which we may draw from these
authorities is that if the automobile is to be covered under the
provision that it replaces an automobile described in the policy,
the automobile must actually replace an automobile described
in the policy. Illustrative of this rule is the case of Mitcham
v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 127 Fed. (2d) 27, 4th Circuit
Court of Appeals 1942, which has previously been referred
to in the A.L.R. annotation and in which it was held where
the insured did not trade in his old automobile on the purchase
price of a new car but left the old automobile with the dealer
for storage and sale, and did not transfer title thereto, the
new auton1obile did not replace" the old one, since the insured
could have at any time taken the old automobile from the
custody of the motor company and put it into use.
n

Another case which is illustrative of this rule is Tanne1'

v. Pennsylvania Thresherrnen & Farmer/ Mutual Casualty Insurance Conzpany, 226 Fed. (2d) 498, 6th Circuit Court of
Appeals 1955. In that case plaintiff recovered a judgment
against two brothers for the death of her husband who was
killed when struck by an automobile owned and driven by one
of the brothers. Plaintiff then brought suit upon the judgment
to enforce its provisions against the defendant insurance company under a policy which insured the other brother. The facts
were that the insured brother, who O\vned a restaurant, borrO\\ ed his brother· s car during the time his automobile \':as
12
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being repaired. The insured brother drove the vehicle on a
couple of errands and then asked the other brother to go on
an errand for him. While the uninsured brother was on the
errand·the accident occurred. It was contended that the car was
covered on the theory that it was a replacement for the insured
vehicle. The court said:
((The judge commented in his opinion that diligent
search had failed to reveal authoritative interpretation
of any policy provision similar to that construed here.
He construed the word (substitute car' to mean a car
which was in the possession or under the control of
the insured to the same extent and effect as the disabled
car of the insured would have been except for its disablement. He pointed out that the Mercury belonging
to Louis was not, at the time of the accident, in the
possession or under the control of the insured; but
that it was in the sole possession and control of Louis
and being operated by him. The conclusion was
reached, therefore, that the liability policy issued to
Mike Zarzour, covering his 1949 0 ldsmobile, did not
embrace liability for the injury and death of appellant's
intestate occasioned by Louis Zarzour' s operation of
his own automobile.
((We think the district judge's conclusion was a correct interpretation of the policy. In our judgment, there
was no issue of fact for presentation to the jury, as
there was no real conflict in the evidence, and the interpretation of the policy was a matter of law. In view
of our conclusion, we consider it unnecessary to discuss
or decide the issue of whether the policy was complied
with in respect of appropriate notice of the accident
and notice of the suit.''
In the case at bar a partner of the plaintiff firrn, C. R.
Jacobs, testified that the partnership at the time in question
13
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owned between fifteen and twenty cars and that only those
leased to the Bearings Service & Supply Company were insured
with the defendant company. Since all of the automobiles of
the plaintiff were not insured under the defendant's policy
the automobile in question would not be covered under the
automatic provision of the policy as an additional automobile
of the plaintiff as it is excluded by the proviso that the company
must insure all of the automobiles owned by the insured. The
most that can be said is that the defendant company insured
those automobiles belonging to the plaintiff which were leased
to the Bearings Service & Supply Company.
The Bearings Service & Supply Company was still using
the automobile which the automobile in question was intended
to replace at the time of this accident and had its entire complement of five automobiles as called for by the lease. It had
not surrendered that vehicle to the plaintiff, and presumably
the plaintiff was charging the firm for the use of the automobile. Bearings Service & Supply Company had not been
given any do1ninion over, nor had it received the custody or
control of the vehicle, nor had the plaintiff assigned that particular vehicle to the lease or taken any action whatsoever
to bring this vehicle within the terms of the lease at the time
the accident occurred. There is nothing in the record or in the
deposition \vhich would have prevented the plaintiff from
1naking \vhatever use it chose of the vehicle and securing another replacen1ent for the Bearings Service & Supply Con1pany.
Therefore, the vehicle cannot be said to be covered as an additional vehicle being leased to the Bearings Service & Supply
Cotn pany since the vehicle \Vas not leased at the time of the
accident.

14
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Mr. Jacobs further testified that at the time of the accident
in question the Bearings Service & Supply Company still had
the vehicle which the subject vehicle was intended to replace,
and was still using that vehicle. Therefore, that vehicle would
not be covered under that provision of the policy which affords
coverage if it replaces an automobile described in the policy,
since it did not in fact replace such an automobile.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff in this case, which owns fifteen or twenty
automobiles, leased five of those automobiles to the Bearings
Service & Supply Company under a lease arrangement which
provided that the lessor should provide insurance on the
vehicles. The Bearings Service & Supply Company provided
insurance on the leased vehicles with the defendant company
under a policy which provides for automatic coverage for
newly acquired vehicles provided ( 1) it replaces an automobile described in the policy or ( 2) it is an additional automobile
and if the company insures all of the automobiles owned by
the insured.
The pleadings, exhibits and the deposition of C. R. Jacobs
on file in this action show conclusively that an automobile being
procured by the plaintiff to replace an automobile then being
used by the Bearings Service & Supply Company was not
covered under the foregoing provision of the policy for the
reason that the defendant did not insure all of the vehicles of
the plaintiff and for the further reason that the automobile
for which damages are sought had not been surrendered to
the Bearings Service & Supply Company and was not being
15
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operated under the lease or subject to the lease at the time
of the accident. The damaged vehicle was not covered under
the part of the policy providing coverage if it replaces an automobile described in the policy for the reason that the automobile which this automobile was eventually intended to
replace \vas still being used by the Bearings Service & Supply
Company at the time this vehicle was damaged.
The foregoing facts were established by the plaintiff's
pleadings and the deposition of C. R. Jacobs, a partner in
plaintiff's firm at the time of the foregoing events, together
with a copy of plaintiff's lease with Bearings Service & Supply
Company and a copy of the plaintiff's insurance policy. In
other words, the evidence comes from the plaintiff itself and
there is no denying the facts, which show as a matter of
law that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in a case of summary judgment, ttThe judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
adn1issions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
It is submitted that under the foregoing facts and the law
\vhich is applicable thereto there v.ras no genuine issue as t~
any material fact and the defendant was entitled to judgment
as a n1atter of law and that, therefore, the trial court's judgn1ent herein should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

CANNON AND HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
lG

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

